Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2024

 Key Takeaways:

• Pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region Transnistria held the Seventh Congress of Transnistrian Deputies on February 28 and adopted a series of decisions that likely aim to provide the Kremlin with justifications for a wide range of possible escalatory actions against Moldova — actions the Kremlin can pursue both immediately and over the long-term.
• The Kremlin has yet to signal an immediate route for escalation following the Congress of Transnistrian Deputies, although Russian President Vladimir Putin may respond to the Transnistrian requests during his speech to the Russian Federal Assembly on February 29.
• The Kremlin can use the outcomes of the Congress of Transnistrian Deputies to justify a range of possible COAs that are not mutually exclusive.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted another strike on a Russian personnel concentration in occupied Donetsk Oblast, once again sparking ire amongst Russian milbloggers and re-surfacing concerns about Ukraine’s use of HIMARS systems.
• Russia continues cracking down on actors it deems “foreign agents” to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the March 2024 presidential election.
• A Financial Times (FT) investigation published on February 27, reportedly based on leaked classified Russian military documents from 2008-2014, outlines Russia’s purported criteria for the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
• Turkey and China appear to be pursuing their own negotiation platforms for a settlement in Ukraine, which the Kremlin will likely exploit to further its long-standing narratives regarding negotiations and the war.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Svatove, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu inspected the Tula State University’s Military Training Center and several defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises in Tula Oblast on February 28.
• Russian occupation authorities are using early voting for the Russian presidential election to cloak Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine in a veneer of fabricated legitimacy.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2024

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Russia Eyes Gulf of Guinea, JNIM Massacres Civilians in Burkina Faso

 Key Takeaways:

• Togo. Reports of a small and potentially growing number of Russian military advisers in Togo indicate that Russia and Togo are increasing their ties as the Kremlin aims to expand its influence beyond the Sahel in West Africa. The Kremlin likely seeks to use Togo as a logistical node to support its other operations in Africa. Russia may also have a long-term aim of securing an Atlantic Ocean port in Togo, which would support the Kremlin’s strategic efforts to increase its threat to NATO’s flanks through basing in Africa. Russia will have to offset competing partnerships with Togo’s remaining non-French Western partners, such as the United States, but a future increase in instability could lead the Togolese government to further increase ties with Russia.
• Burkina Faso. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate is increasing violence against civilians in eastern Burkina Faso, likely to coerce and deter civilians from resisting the group to expand its support zones. The group’s campaign is likely setting conditions to besiege the Est regional capital, Fada N’Gourma, the largest town in southeastern Burkina Faso.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-eyes-gulf-guinea-jnim-massacres-civilians-burkina-faso

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China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 29, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• The PRC Coast Guard patrolled prohibited and restricted waters around Taiwan-controlled Kinmen, likely as part of a PRC strategy to assert sovereignty over the island.
• The PRC has increased deployments of research vessels in Taiwan’s contiguous zone to assert its territorial claims over Taiwan.
• The Kuomintang chose defense obstructionist Ma Wen-chun to co-chair the Foreign and National Defense Committee of the Legislative Yuan. Ma proposed 135 cuts or freezes to Taiwan’s defense budget during 2023.
• CCP rhetoric regarding Taiwan signals a redoubling of efforts to exert pressure on the ROC under the DPP's renewed mandate.
• The PRC’s recent national security policy initiatives reflect the CCP’s growing threat perception of security risks to classified and sensitive information in the fraught geopolitical climate.
• The Chinese Coast Guard has continued efforts to assert control over Scarborough Shoal. It erected a floating barrier and intercepted vessels that belong to the Philippine Coast Guard and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources.
• The PRC is pursuing security cooperation with Kiribati to increase its security foothold in the Pacific Islands.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-february-29-2024

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Iran Update 28FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Gaza City: Palestinian militias have claimed at least 92 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun, southeastern Gaza City, between February 19 and February 28. This high attack rate involving at least seven Palestinian militias using sophisticated military capabilities indicates that Palestinian fighters have retained military capacity in southern Gaza City despite two Israeli clearing operations there.

• The militias likely infiltrated into previously cleared areas of southern Gaza City from the uncleared central Gaza Strip. The militias also likely reactivated dormant cells after the Israelis decreased the size of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) contingent in the northern Strip. 

• The attacks in Zaytoun are in response to the ongoing division-sized clearing operation targeting Zaytoun. The IDF 162nd Division continued its clearing operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 28. 

• Rafah: IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari said on February 27 that Israel seeks to ensure displaced Gazan civilians have access to food, aid, medicine, and hospital facilities in a separate, safer zone before conducting ground operations in Rafah. 

• Negotiations: Israeli negotiators are expected to leave Qatar on February 29 if there is no significant breakthrough in ceasefire talks, according to two Israeli sources familiar with the process. 

• Yemen: CENTCOM and an unspecified coalition warship shot down five Houthi one-way attack drones over the Red Sea on February 27. 

• Iraq-Russia: The Iraqi government may request a sanctions waiver to purchase spare parts for Russian-manufactured helicopters. A Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member cited by an independent Iraqi news outlet said that there is an “unannounced” effort to resolve the shortage of parts for Iraq’s Russian-made helicopters.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-28-2024

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US Military Theories of Victory for a War with the PRC

The return of strategic competition and the war in Ukraine have highlighted the stark risks of conflict with nuclear-armed great powers: Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Such a conflict would entail escalation risks that the United States has not seriously considered since the Cold War. A key question for the U.S. Department of Defense is how to prevail in such a war while limiting the scope of escalation. A better understanding of this challenge can help inform force development and prepare future leaders for high-stakes deliberations on the risks and trade-offs involved in fighting another great-power war, should this war come to pass.

This paper outlines potential U.S. theories of victory for a war with the PRC and analyzes their associated escalation risks. The paper is intended for defense strategists and force planners interested in preparing for future conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary. The research was commissioned by the Department of the Air Force and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of a fiscal year 2022 project, “Winning Wars While Managing the Risks of Escalation.” Data collection and analysis began in October 2021 and continued through September 2022.

 https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1743-1.html

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Russian Operations Assessment 27FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Russian forces are attempting to exploit tactical opportunities offered by the Russian seizure of Avdiivka and appear to be maintaining a relatively high tempo of offensive operations aimed at pushing as far as possible in the Avdiivka area before Ukrainian forces establish more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive lines in the area. 

• Russian forces are likely attempting to create an operational maneuver force for the exploitation of recent Russian advances in the Avdiivka direction. 

• The Russian command likely hopes that the reorganization of command structures will establish more cohesive Russian grouping of forces throughout the theater in Ukraine. 

• Recent developments in Transnistria, the pro-Russian breakaway region of Moldova, are unlikely to pose a military threat to Ukraine and will more likely impact Moldova’s European Union (EU) integration prospects. ISW is amending its warning forecast in light of continued Transnistrian officials’ statements that the upcoming Congress of Transnistrian Deputies will discuss Moldovan economic policies, likely related to changes to Moldova’s Customs Code that went into effect on January 1, 2024. 

• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu continues to highlight recent Russian tactical successes in Ukraine as substantial battlefield victories for political purposes ahead of the upcoming Russian presidential election. Shoigu additionally highlighted Russia’s Central and Eastern Military Districts (CMD and EMD) to posture against supposed anti-Russian activity in Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific. 

• Ukrainian forces have reportedly shot down two Russian Su-34s on February 27, the tenth downed Russian military aircraft within roughly as many days. 

• Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on February 27 that the ongoing Russian information campaign to demoralize Ukrainian society will intensify between March and May 2024. 

• Russia likely tested an element of its Sovereign Internet on February 27, likely in an effort to strengthen control over individual aspects of the Russian information space. 

• Russian forces advanced west of Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements across the theater. 

• A Ukrainian official warned that Russia seeks to ramp up force generation efforts in occupied Ukraine following the formal integration of occupied and claimed Ukrainian territories into the Russian Southern Military District (SMD). • Russian authorities are reportedly systematizing the adoption of deported Ukrainian children in Russia.

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ArmyIgnitED Unsigned Tuition Assistance Requests

Date Published: 26 Feb 24

Subject: ArmyIgnitED Unsigned Tuition Assistance (TA) Requests

1. Soldier Signature REQUIRED on Tuition Assistance Requests

   a. Soldiers must log into their ArmyIgnitED account (https://www.armyignited.army.mil/) to check for and sign any unsigned TA Requests. A Soldier signature is required on all TA Requests. Changes made to a previously submitted TA Request or a TA Request created on a Soldier’s behalf by an Army Education Counselor, still require a Soldier signature.

   b. Any unsigned FY23 TA Requests will be deleted on 1 April 2024. Effective 20 March 2024, any unsigned FY24 and forward TA Requests will be deleted 30 days after the term start date has passed.

   c. Without a Soldier signature, Academic Institutions (schools) will not be able to invoice the Army and TA funding will NOT be applied. This will create an outstanding student balance on Soldiers’ school accounts.

   d. For further assistance with TA Requests, Soldiers should contact their Army Education Center.



Army Credentialing and Continuing Education Services for Soldiers (ACCESS)
Army University

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Russian Operations Assessment 26FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Sweden will join NATO following Hungary’s formal approval of Sweden’s accession bid on February 26. 

• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed two decrees on February 26 that officially re-establish the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, codifying major Russian military restructuring and reform efforts. 

• The formal transfer of regions previously under the responsibility of the Northern Fleet is likely part of a wider Russian effort to re-establish military district commands as the primary headquarters for the Russian ground forces while reassigning naval assets to the Russian Navy, as ISW previously reported. 

• The re-creation of the MMD and LMD supports the parallel objectives of consolidating control over Russian operations in Ukraine in the short-to-medium term and preparing for a potential future large-scale conventional war against NATO in the long term. 

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 25 that Russia is preparing a new offensive that will start in late May or summer 2024, consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have regained the theater-wide initiative and will be able to pursue offensive operations when and where they choose as long as they hold the initiative. 

• Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov is continuing a recent campaign to engage with Russian military personnel following the Russian capture of Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast and reportedly visited a command post of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) in Ukraine. 

• Over 20 heads of state, including 15 European Union (EU) leaders met in Paris on February 26 to discuss ramping up ammunition supplies to Ukraine. 

• Germany announced a new military aid package to Ukraine on February 26. 

• Transnistrian sources reportedly told Russian independent outlet Verstka that Transnistria, a pro-Russian breakaway region of Moldova, is not planning to ask to join Russia during the Congress of Deputies in Tiraspol on February 28.

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Iran Update 26FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Northern and Central Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces announced that its 162nd Division uncovered a Hamas tunnel network connecting the Central Gaza Governorate to the northern Gaza Strip over the past several weeks. 

• Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis. Palestinian militias targeted Israeli forces operating in Abasan al Kabira, east of Khan Younis. 

• Political Negotiations: Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh met with the Qatari Emir to discuss ceasefire negotiations. 

• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank. Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh resigned. 

• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. 

• Iraq: Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have signaled that they will resume conducting attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East. 

• Syria: Local Syrian sources reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is trying to rebuild its military infrastructure in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria. 

• Yemen: US CENTCOM reported that it intercepted three Houthi one-way attack drones. 

• Iran: The International Atomic Energy Organization disclosed to UN member states that Iran has reduced its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since late October 2023.

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Russian Operations Assessment 25FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Russian officials and state media largely refrained from publicly discussing the two-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, likely in an effort to avoid addressing Russia’s failure to achieve its stated war aims at significant human costs. 

• Russian officials and state-run and state-affiliated TV channels likely refrained from commenting on the two-year anniversary of the start of Russia’s fullscale invasion to avoid drawing attention to Russia’s failures to achieve its stated strategic goals in Ukraine and its more immediate goals of seizing all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, while also suffering high personnel losses. 

• Ukrainian officials discussed Ukraine’s goals and priorities for 2024 on February 25 and highlighted the need for continued Ukrainian innovation and Western aid to accomplish Ukraine’s objectives. 

• Drone footage posted on February 25 shows Russian forces committing apparent war crimes near Bakhmut. 

• The Russian information space continues to be highly sensitive to the recent losses of A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft, suggesting that the issue of deploying and defending these aircraft is of great concern. 

• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Russia has not received any long-range missiles from Iran as of February 25. 

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Krynky amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on February 25.

• Russian authorities continue efforts to recruit Ukrainian citizens in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military. 

• Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on February 25 that Russia is holding over 28,000 Ukrainian citizens captive in Russian prisons.

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Government Shutdown Impacts on FY24 TA/CA Requests

Date Published: 23 Feb 24

Subject: Potential Government Shutdown Impacts on FY24 Tuition Assistance and Credentialing Assistance Requests

1.  Tuition Assistance

    a. If Congress does not pass a Budget or Continuing Resolution before 9 March 2024, approved FY24 Tuition Assistance (TA) Requests may be cancelled.  ACCESS will cancel TA Requests starting on 8 March 2024 at 2359 GMT (1959 EDT) for 9 March 2024 term start dates and will continue daily cancellations throughout the government shutdown. These daily cancellations will continue until either a Budget or a Continuing Resolution is approved by Congress and signed by the President.
        •  Soldiers whose TA Requests were cancelled due to the government shutdown will receive a message in ArmyIgnitED.

        •  Soldiers whose TA Requests were cancelled due to the government shutdown must submit a new TA Request for a future term date.

        •  Soldiers will not be permitted to submit future-dated TA Requests during the government shutdown.

        •  There will be no historical TA Requests created for courses with term start dates during the shutdown.

        •  Soldiers should review the “Conditions” section on their TA Request and understand the terms of this agreement to include the following statement, “I understand that TA for courses starting in the next fiscal year is conditional until the receipt of the TA funds.” Without a Budget or Continuing Resolution, the Army will not receive TA funding. 

        •  Soldiers should work with their academic institution or local Army Education Center (if available during the shutdown) to make an informed decision on whether to withdraw from courses during the government shutdown or remain enrolled and assume the risk of self-pay.

        •  Soldiers who attend courses during the government shutdown will be responsible for costs incurred with their Academic Institution.

    b.  For additional questions, contact your Army Education Center.

2. Credentialing Assistance

    a.  If Congress does not pass a Budget or Continuing Resolution before 9 March 2024, pending FY24 Credentialing Assistance (CA) Requests may be cancelled.  ACCESS will cancel pending CA Requests starting on 8 March 2024 at 2359 GMT (1959 EDT) for 9 March 2024 start dates during the government shutdown. These daily cancellations will continue until either a Budget or a Continuing Resolution is approved by Congress and signed by the President. More guidance will be provided on CA Request start dates after the government returns to work.

        •  Soldiers whose CA Requests were cancelled due to the government shutdown will be informed via ArmyIgnitED messaging.

        •  Soldiers whose CA Requests were cancelled due to the government shutdown must submit a new CA Request. CA requests must be submitted not earlier than 45 days, but not later than 90 days, prior to the start date of either the course or the exam.

        •  Soldiers whose CA Requests were cancelled due to the government shutdown will not be able to get retroactive CA to pay for courses or exams that started during the government shutdown.

        •  Soldiers FY funding limit will be automatically reset to reflect total allowable amount remaining after cancellation.

        •  Soldiers should contact the Army CA Virtual Counseling Cell for guidance or assistance at: https://www.cool.osd.mil/army/costs_and_funding/index.html?credentialingassistance

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Iran Update 25FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City. 

• Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces has continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis. 

• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least six times in the West Bank. 

• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. 

• Yemen: The USS Mason intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile targeting USflagged, owned, and operated oil tanker MV Torm Thor

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MGIB Kicker-Do You Have One?

Greetings,

We are not processing as many Kickers as we should, and we should remedy this. $350 for 36 months can go further than you think.  

Montgomery GI Bill - Selected Reserve Kicker (Overview)

The Montgomery GI Bill – Selected Reserve (MGIB-SR) Kicker is an educational assistance supplement that is available to promote accessions and retention in the SELRES to those members serving in critical specialties, skills, or units. Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) Guidance Counselors (GC) issue NPS Kickers through the Guidance Counselor Resource Center (GCRC). The State GI Bill Manager as approver is not authorized to issue Kickers. PS Kickers are issued by a GC at MEPS or by a Reserve Component Career Counselor (RCCC). Kickers for currently serving members are processed by unit authorized personnel only. Authorized unit personnel issue Kickers through GIMS. The MGIB-SR Kicker provides an educational allowance in addition to the GI Bill basic benefit. Title 10 U.S.C., Section 16131 and DoDI 1322.17 authorizes the MGIB-SR Kicker.  

• A Service Member (SM) may receive MGIB-SR Kicker payments for up to 36 months or until MGIB-SR or MGIB-AD eligibility is exhausted, whichever comes first.
• The Kicker is paid along with GI Bill payments. It is not a stand-alone benefit!
• The Kicker contract can be found in your military record = IPERM. If the Kicker contract is not in your file, you must contact your recruiter or MEPS station.
• Changes to your MOS, unit, or Rank, could impact your eligibility.   

PLEASE CONTACT THE STATE GI BILL PROGRAM MANAGER FOR MORE INFORMATION.

Who is Eligible?

A SM who has not previously established eligibility for a MGIB-SR Kicker in any Reserve Component.

A SM who is currently eligible or is establishing eligibility for MGIB-SR or MGIB-AD 

A SM who enlists, reenlists, or extends an enlistment to commit to a six-year service obligation. (A SM who has six or more years remaining until their Expiration Term of Service (ETS) does not need to extend). The SM must have a concurrent six-year service obligation from the effective date of the MGIB-SR Kicker contract. 

Before receiving payment, the SM must complete:
(1) The requirements for a secondary school diploma or an equivalency certificate (Tier 1 or Tier 2).
(2) MOS or Area of Concentration (AOC) branch qualification.

(3) The SM must apply with the Department of Veterans Affairs to apply to use the benefit. This process must be done by the individual and not a third-party member or school official.

Once the SM meets all the requirements, MGIB-SR Kicker eligibility is established.

TYPES OF KICKERS

Prior Service - $350

(1) ASVAB/Armed Forces Classification Test (AFCT) TSC I-IIIA (50 or above).
(2) Grade E7 or below.
(3) Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualified (DMOSQ) in contracted MOS.
(4) If enlisting from a branch of service other than Army, meet the requirements to be awarded the contracted MOS at the time of enlistment/affiliation. Eligibility will not be established until coded DMOSQ in IPPS-A.

Non-Prior Service - $350

(1) Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) Test Score Category (TSC) I-IIIA (50 or above).
(2) Possess a high school diploma or equivalent (Education Tier Level 1 or 2).
(3) Enlisting into a critical skill or unit. A critical skill or unit is any MOS in a MTOE or authorized TDA unit IAW current SRIP policy scored as an AUVS Tier Level 1-7 position.
(4) Includes Civilian Acquired Skills Program (CASP) or Split-Training Option. Does not include Glossary NPS.
(5) The following criteria applies to applicants enlisting under the Foreign Language Recruiting Initiative (FLRI):
(a) Must be assigned MOS 09C.
(b) Must attend and complete English language training.
(c) Must retest on the AFCT and achieve a score of 50 or above prior to shipping to basic combat training.
(d) Must enlist into a critical skill or unit.

(e) If the applicant does not achieve a score of 50 or higher on the AFCT, the Kicker will be invalidated. FLRI enlistees whose Kickers are invalidated may still be eligible to contract for the Reenlistment (RE) Kicker upon meeting the requirements in paragraph c below. 

Reenlistment - $350

(1) Must have completed three consecutive years of service in the ARNG.
Soldiers who do not have three consecutive years of service in the ARNG may reenlist for the MGIB-SR Kicker up to one year prior to their ETS date, however, the effective date of the Kicker will not be until the Soldier has completed three years and the Soldier must have six years remaining on their enlistment contract.
(2) Have not completed more than 14 total years of service at the time of signing the addendum.
(3) ASVAB or Armed Forces Classification Test (AFCT) TSC I-IIIA (50 or above).
(4) Grade E7 or below.
(5) DMOSQ in contracted MOS.

Standard Officer (SOK) - $350

(1) Accept commission into the ARNG regardless of commissioning source. All officers who have not previously contracted for a Kicker are eligible for the SOK, including Direct Commissioned Officers and Officers without a bachelor’s degree.
(2) Sign a DA Form 5447 Officer Service Agreement (OSA), agreeing to remain in the ARNG for six years.
(3) Complete the NGB Form 5435 on the same date as the DA 5447, and no later than one year after commissioning or recommissioning (Note: recommissioning must have been into a different area of concentration and/or branch).

(4) The Officer must complete the requirements for Branch Qualification before being eligible to receive payment. 

Officer Candidate School (OCS) - $350

(1) Have completed IADT and been awarded an enlisted MOS.
(2) Enrolled into the OCS program and been awarded 09S MOS.
(3) Have not commissioned.
(4) Complete the DA 4836 and NGB Form 5435.
(5) The Candidate must complete OCS and accept a commission in the ARNG to retain this incentive. 

Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) - $350

(1) Have completed IADT and been awarded an enlisted MOS.
(2) Enrolled into the ROTC program and been awarded 09R MOS.
(3) Have not received a ROTC Scholarship under Title 10, Section 2107.
(4) Have not commissioned.
(5) Complete a Simultaneous Membership Program Agreement (NGB Form 594-1) and ROTC Cadet Contract (DA Form 597 Series).
(6) Complete the DA 4836 and NGB Form 5435.
(7) The Cadet must complete ROTC and accept a commission in the ARNG to retain this incentive. 

Warrant Officer Candidate (WOC) - $350

(1) Have completed IADT and been awarded an enlisted MOS.
(2) Entered the WOC program and been awarded 09W MOS.
(3) Have not commissioned.
(4) Complete the DA 4836 and NGB Form 5435.
(5) The Candidate must complete Warrant Officer Candidate School and accept a position as a warrant officer in the ARNG to retain this incentive.

Officer Supplemental (Bump-Up) - $350 - This Kicker is not a new Kicker contract; it is a rate increase for an existing MGIB-SR Kicker issued at a lower amount to increase the rate to $350.

(1) SM must have established eligibility and be currently eligible for an Accessions or Current Guard Kicker at the $100 or $200 rate.
(2) Enter either the OCS, ROTC, or WOC Officer Commissioning Program or accept a commission in the ARNG.
(3) Awarded 09S (OCS), 09R (ROTC), or 09W (WOC) as Duty MOS.
(4) Sign the MGIB-SR Kicker Supplemental addendum (NGB Form 5435-1) no later than one year after commissioning.
(5) If the SM has completed the six-year obligation for the original MGIB-SR Kicker, no additional service is required.
(6) If the SM has not completed the six-year obligation, the SM must complete the balance of the obligation to retain the higher Officer Supplemental rate. An OSA is not required.
(7) The Officer Candidates must complete the Commissioning Program and accept commission in the ARNG to retain the higher Supplemental rate.

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Iran Update 22FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Yemen: Iran and the Houthis are likely using their attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to test and refine their approach to striking naval targets. 

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces 162nd Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Zaytoun, eastern Gaza City. 

• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis. 

• Political Negotiations: Hamas said that there may be progress in negotiations with Israel over a prisoner-or-hostage deal. 

• Iraq: Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi discussed the US military presence in Iraq with US Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Chris Coons and US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski. 

• Iran: Iranian Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharazi met with senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad officials in Tehran.

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Russian Operations Assessment 22FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia would likely have to seize Kyiv sooner or later while identifying Russia’s possible further territorial objectives in Ukraine. 

• Medvedev’s mention of Russia’s possible intentions to occupy Odesa may be worth noting in light of recent developments in the pro-Russian breakaway republic of Transnistria in Moldova, the southern tip of which is about 50 kilometers from the city. 

• Medvedev also described Russian plans to repress Ukrainian citizens in occupied Ukraine. 

• Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) leaders and Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov on February 21 and 22. 

• Ukrainian forces conducted another successful strike against a Russian training ground in occupied Kherson Oblast on February 21 and likely inflicted significant casualties. 

• Ukraine’s European and Western allies continue to ramp up their support for Ukraine. 

• Russian opposition outlet Proekt reported on February 22 that the Russian government has subjected at least 116,000 Russians to criminal and administrative charges since the start of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fourth term in office in 2018. 

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 22 that the Kremlin does not regard Russian military correspondents (voyenkory) and milbloggers as participants of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, shortly after the suicide of a prominent Russian milblogger on February 21. 

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Avdiivka. 

• A Russian insider source claimed that Russian officials have postponed creating Rosgvardia’s 1st Volunteer Corps from remaining Wagner Group detachments because of an ongoing rotation of former Wagner personnel in Africa. 

• Russia continues to export its state policies on systemic religious persecution to occupied Ukraine.

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Iran Update 21FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Iran: Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to Russia in early January. Iran’s arms sales to Russia are part of Iran’s efforts to generate revenue to support its deteriorating economy. 

• Iran’s provision of these missile systems could improve Russia’s ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. 

• Iraq-Russia: Russian and Iraqi officials discussed deepening judicial and economic ties on February 21.

• Iraqi Federal Integrity Commission Chairman Haider Hanoun, who is affiliated with the Badr Organization, and Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for anti-corruption coordination and training on February 21. 

• Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors have previously used Iraq’s judicial system to target political opposition. 

• ISW previously reported on the Kremlin‘s use of the Russian Prosecutor General‘s Office to seize and nationalize assets from Russians and to widely apply administrative law to stifle any perceived source of opposition. 

• Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on February 21 that Houthi fighters fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the MV Sea Champion, which was transporting humanitarian aid to Yemen, on February 19. 

• Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said that two brigades launched a new clearing operation in Zaytoun, southern Gaza City.

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Russian Operations Assessment 21FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Prominent independent Russian milblogger Andrei Morozov reportedly committed suicide on February 21 after refusing the Russian military command’s orders to delete his reports about high Russian casualty rates around Avdiivka. 

• A Ukrainian official denied a recent New York Times (NYT) report that Russian forces may have captured “hundreds” of Ukrainian soldiers during Ukraine’s withdrawal from Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast. 

• Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized Avdiivka within a “fairly short time.” 

• A Ukrainian HIMARS strike against an undefended Russian training ground near occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast likely inflicted significant casualties, triggering a point of neuralgia for the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community. 

• Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky openly admitted that Russian authorities are forcibly deporting Ukrainian citizens who oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or “insult” Russia and possibly alluded to Russian occupation forces’ summarily executing Ukrainian citizens. 

• Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to Russia in early January. 

• Russian authorities detained a dual US-Russian citizen in Yekaterinburg on suspicion of raising money for the Ukrainian war effort. 

• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka, Donetsk City, Robotyne, and Krynky. 

• Belarusian and Kazakh companies are reportedly helping Russia circumvent international sanctions intended to deprive the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) of Western components and machines. 

• Russian occupation administrations continue to foster patronage networks with Russian federal subjects.

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Iran Update 20FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Iraq: Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there. 

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces launched a new, “division-wide” clearing operation in the Zaytoun and Shujaiya neighborhoods in eastern Gaza City. 

• Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces assessed that it will complete ground operations in Khan Younis in the next few days, according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent. • Political Negotiations: Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh arrived in Cairo to discuss a ceasefire in Gaza with Egyptian officials. 

• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters nine times. 

• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. 

• Yemen: The Houthis claimed three drone attacks targeting US and Israeli targets. 

• Iran: International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi said that Iran is continuing to produce highly enriched uranium at an elevated rate.

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Russian Operations Assessment 20FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Ukraine has been defending itself against illegal Russian military intervention and aggression for 10 years. 

• Russia’s grand strategic objective of regaining control of Ukraine has remained unchanged in the decade since its illegal intervention in Ukraine began.

• Russia worked hard to obfuscate its grand strategic objectives of regaining control of Ukraine between 2014 and the start of the fullscale invasion in 2022. 

• Russian military intelligence is reportedly learning from its failures in recent years and has renewed efforts against NATO states. 

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu preened themselves on the Russian seizure of Avdiivka. 

• Shoigu also claimed that Russian forces completely seized Krynky in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, although available open-source visual evidence and Ukrainian and Russian reporting suggests that Ukrainian forces maintain their limited bridgehead in the area. 

• The Kremlin likely prematurely claimed the Russian seizure of Krynky to reinforce its desired informational effects ahead of the March 2024 presidential election, although the Kremlin is likely setting expectations that the Russian military may fail to meet. 

• The New York Times (NYT) reported that the Ukrainian withdrawal from Avdiivka may have left hundreds of Ukrainian personnel “unaccounted” for. 

• Ukrainian officials launched an investigation into additional apparent Russian violations of the Geneva Conventions on prisoners of war (POWs) in Zaporizhia Oblast. 

• Russian forces made a confirmed advance west of Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline. 

• The Kremlin continues to promote Russia’s efforts to expand its defense industrial base (DIB).

• Zaporizhia Oblast occupation authorities are expanding public services provision in occupied parts of the oblast to consolidate bureaucratic control and generate dependencies on the occupation administration.

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Russian Operations Assessment 19FEB2204

Key Takeaways: 

•Russian actors conducted a cyber operation regarding Russia’s seizure of Avdiivka, likely aimed at generating panic in the Ukrainian information space and weakening Ukrainian morale.

•The tempo of Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka has reportedly dramatically slowed following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka.

•Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two more Russian fighter aircraft, a Su-34 and a Su-35S, in eastern Ukraine on the morning of February 19.

•The White House is reportedly considering the provision of long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine in the event that Congress passes security assistance for Ukraine.

•The Russian government eased the requirements for “compatriots” living abroad to apply to resettle in Russia.

•Emirati banks reportedly began to limit some transactions with Russian entities and close Russian citizens’ accounts in September 2023 due to the risk of Western secondary sanctions.

•Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reiterated that Armenia does not support Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine against the backdrop of deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.

•Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

•Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitri Medvedev claimed on February 19 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has recruited more than 53,000 military personnel since January 1, 2024.

•Russian authorities have reportedly returned Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine and Russia to relatives in Ukraine.

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Iran Update 15FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Iran: Russian Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov paid an official visit to Iran, likely to discuss Russo-Iranian defense industrial and military cooperation. 

• Iraq: Some Sunni and Shia Iraqi political factions appear divided on expelling US forces from Iraq. 

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces reported that it concluded a two-week long, division-sized raid in western Gaza City. 

• Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued to conduct clearing operations in several sectors of Khan Younis. 

• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least six times. Hamas called for three days of demonstrations in the West Bank and abroad. 

• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted eleven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

 • Yemen: The Houthis claimed that they conducted a missile attack targeting a Barbados-flagged, Greek-owned vessel in the Gulf of Aden.

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Russian Operations Assessment 15FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Russian forces are conducting a tactical turning movement through Avdiika likely to create conditions that would force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from their positions in the settlement. Ukrainian forces have yet to fully withdraw from the settlement and continue to prevent Russian forces from making gains that are more significant than the current incremental Russian advances. 

• The Russian offensive effort to capture Avdiivka underscores the Russian military’s inability to conduct a successful operational envelopment or encirclement in Ukraine. 

• The potential Russian capture of Avdiivka would not be operationally significant and would likely only offer the Kremlin immediate informational and political victories. 

• The Russian command reportedly reorganized the command structures of the Russian grouping of forces in southern Ukraine. 

• Russian forces conducted a relatively larger series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 14 to 15. 

• Ukrainian security forces reportedly conducted a successful drone strike against an oil depot in Kursk Oblast. 

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to elaborate on an amorphous ideology for Russia to support geopolitical confrontation with the West by attempting to portray Russia as the leader of an international anti-Nazi movement. 

• Putin intentionally misrepresented a statement from US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in an attempt to promote pseudo-history aimed at denying Ukrainian statehood. 

• Russian sources claimed that the Russian military officially removed Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov and replaced him with the BSF’s Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Sergei Pinchuk. 

• Select members of the US-led coalition the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (also known as the Ramstein format) formally launched an air defense coalition and agreed to form a drone coalition and demining coalition to support Ukraine following the group’s 19th meeting in Brussels on February 14. 

• NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced that NATO and Ukraine will create a joint analysis, training, and education center in Poland following the meetings of NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels on February 15. 

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kupyansk, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. 

• Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Uralvagonzavod plant in Sverdlovsk Oblast, one of Russia’s largest tank producers, on February 15 to promote Russian efforts to expand Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). 

• Head of Ukraine’s nuclear operating enterprise Energoatom Petro Kotin stated that the situation at the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is becoming more dangerous due to Russian activity near and at the plant.

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Iran Update 13FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Southern Gaza Strip: Israel presented a proposal to move displaced Gazans in Rafah to Egyptian-built tent cities in the southwestern Gaza Strip, according to the Wall Street Journal. 

• Negotiations: Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan claimed on February 12 that Egyptian and Qatar mediators believe that the Hamas ceasefire proposal that Qatar delivered to Israel “opened a way to reach an agreement.” 

• Hamdan reiterated Hamas’ longstanding requirements for a ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, which include the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the end of Israeli military operations, humanitarian aid and reconstruction, and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal. 

• Lebanon: France outlined a three-step plan to deescalate the conflict on the Israel-Lebanon border and force Lebanese Hezbollah to withdraw six miles from the Israeli border. 

• Iran: Former Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Director General Ali Akbar Salehi said during an interview on February 11 that Iran is able to develop nuclear weapons.

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Russian Operations Assessment 13FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• The US Senate passed a supplemental appropriations bill that would provide roughly $60 billion of security assistance to Ukraine, the vast majority of which would go to US companies and personnel. 

• Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attempting to restore maneuver to the battlefield through Soviet deep battle theory but are struggling with implementing Soviet deep battle so far due to current Ukrainian capabilities. 

• The current Ukrainian battlefield capabilities that are denying Russian forces the ability to restore maneuver to the battlefield on Russian terms largely depend on the provision of Western military assistance in key systems, many of which only the US can provide at scale. 

• Ukrainian forces will not be able to retain these advantages and deny Russian forces the ability to restore maneuver to the battlefield on Russian terms without further assistance from the United States and its partner countries in the near and medium term. 

• Russian sources are purposefully exaggerating Ukrainian casualties in a Russian strike near Selydove, Donetsk Oblast on February 13. 

• The Kremlin appears to be asserting the right to enforce Russian Federation law on officials of governments in NATO member states over actions taken in the performance of their official duties within the territories of their own countries. 

• US sanctions are reportedly constraining Russian efforts to skirt the G7 oil cap amid continued indications that India may be rethinking its growing position as a customer of Russian oil. 

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline. 

• The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank stated on February 12 that Russia is likely able to sustain its current rate of vehicle losses for at least two to three years by producing new vehicles and reactivating vehicles from storage.

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Iran Update 12FEB2024

Key Takeaways:

 • Russia: Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate reported that elements of Lebanese Hezbollah and the IRGC are training Russian drone operators at the Shayrat Air Base in Syria. 

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement stated that it reestablished contact with its “combat units” in southwestern Gaza City. 

• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces conducted an overnight raid to rescue Hamas-held hostages in Rafah. 

• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters two times. 

• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. 

• Iraq: The Iraqi Parliament discussed the removal of US-led international coalition forces from Iraq in a session. 

• Yemen: The Houthis launched at least two anti-ship missiles targeting a Greek-owned, Marshall Islandsflagged commercial vessel carrying Brazilian corn to Iran. 

• Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is conducting a regional tour and politically coordinating with senior Axis of Resistance leaders in Lebanon, Syria, and Qatar.

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Russian Operations Assessment 12FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that elements of Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are training Russian drone operators at the Shayrat Air Base in Syria. 

• The Russian State Duma is considering a bill to restrict actors that the Russian government designates as “undesirable” from entering Russia, likely as part of ongoing efforts to censor opposition media outlets and dismantle ties between Russia and foreign and international nongovernmental organizations. 

• Boris Nadezhdin, the only openly anti-war Russian presidential candidate, filed two lawsuits in the Russian Supreme Court challenging the Russian Central Election Commission’s (CEC) refusal to register him as a candidate as the Kremlin continues efforts to suppress popular opposition while trying to preserve the veneer of legitimacy of Russian presidential elections. 

• The European Union (EU) is beginning to take concrete steps towards possibly using frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine. 

• Ukrainian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna and Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kupyansk and Kreminna. 

• South Korean news outlet Yonhap News Agency reported on February 12 that North Korea has developed 240mm guided multiple rocket launcher system (MLRS) mortar that North Korea may export to Russia. 

• Russian authorities continue to use youth engagement programs to Russify Ukrainian youth.

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Russian Operations Assessment 11FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk as Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander, replacing current Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi.

• Russian forces appear to have constructed a 30-kilometer-long barrier dubbed the “tsar train” in occupied Donetsk Oblast, possibly to serve as a defensive line against future Ukrainian assaults. 

• Ukrainian military observers indicated that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is not as productive as Russian authorities portray it to be, but that the Russian DIB is still capable of sustaining Russia’s war effort. 

• Russia’s current limited DIB production capacity and insufficient serial tank production lines are not guarantees that Russia will struggle to produce enough materiel to sustain its war effort at its current pace or in the long term. 

• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline. 

• CNN reported on February 11 that Russia has recruited as many as 15,000 Nepalis to fight in Ukraine, many of whom complained about poor conditions and lack of adequate training before their deployment to the most active frontlines in Ukraine. 

• Russian authorities continue efforts to solidify social control over youth and students in occupied Ukraine and to culturally indoctrinate them into Russian identity and ideology.

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Iran Update 11FEB2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Northern and central Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the northern and central Gaza Strip. 

• Southern Gaza Strip: Hamas, Egyptian, and Houthi officials issued threats likely to dissuade the IDF from a military operation into Rafah. 

• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters twice. 

• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. 

• Syria: Likely Iranian-backed militants tried to conduct a drone attack targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria. 

• Yemen: US Central Command forces conducted self-defense strikes targeting Houthi antiship cruise missiles and unmanned surface vessels.

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