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Monday, March 11, 2024

Iran Update, March 8, 2024

Key Takeaways:

  • Gaza Strip: The United States will construct a temporary pier on the coast of the Gaza Strip to facilitate the arrival and distribution of humanitarian aid.
  • The European Union announced that it is planning to open an emergency maritime aid corridor from Cyprus to the Gaza Strip sometime between March 8 and 10 as part of a joint effort with its allies, including the United States.
  • US Military Operations in the Middle East: CENTCOM commander Gen. Michael Kurilla said that US forces have not deterred the Houthis during a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing. Kurilla also said that US airstrikes on February 2 and February 7 deterred Iran or its proxies and partners from continuing attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria. Kurilla emphasized that deterrence is temporary.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces conducted a clearing operation to reclear Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Israeli news reported that the IDF ordered Brig. Gen. Moshe Tamir to draft plans for a possible Israeli ground operation into southern Lebanon.
  • Yemen: US CENTCOM intercepted three drones that the Houthis launched toward the Gulf of Aden.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-8-2024

Iran Update, March 9, 2024

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli raids in several sectors of the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Central Gaza Strip: The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: Israeli Mossad Chief Dadi Barnea told CIA Director Bill Burns that Hamas is not interested in a ceasefire deal and is intent to “burn the area” during Ramadan.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Israel: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting Israeli military and civilian infrastructure in Haifa and in the Golan Heights.
  • Yemen: The Houthis fired naval missiles at Singapore-flagged, owned, and operated vessel M/V Propel Fortune in the Gulf of Aden.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-9-2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 8, 2024

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated that a ceasefire in Ukraine would allow Russia to rebuild its forces and means for future offensive operations, as Russia previously did following the start of Russia’s 2014 invasion.
  • Some Russian forces may have improved their tactical capabilities and leveraged limited tactical surprise during the final weeks of the Russian effort to seize Avdiivka, suggesting that select elements of the Russian military may have internalized tactical adaptations from conducting offensive operations in Ukraine.
  • Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk stated on March 8 that Ukrainian forces are regularly targeting Russian fighter aircraft.
  • Ukraine’s European partners continue efforts to send additional aid and materiel to Ukraine.
  • The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors approved a resolution calling for Russia’s withdrawal from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), undermining Russian efforts to use the IAEA and other international organizations to legitimize its occupation of the plant.
  • Ukrainian efforts to encourage women to serve in the Ukrainian armed forces continues allowing Ukraine to tap into a wider mobilization base for its war effort.
  • Russian information space actors are intensifying their focus on covering recent events surrounding the governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, and are amplifying Kremlin narratives aimed at destabilizing Moldova to a wider audience.
  • A recent Russian state-run poll suggests that the Kremlin aims for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s predetermined “support level” to be around 80 percent in the upcoming March 17 presidential election in an effort to portray Putin as legitimately popular and use the March election to legitimize Putin’s next term.
  • Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on March 8.
  • BBC Russian Service and Russian opposition outlet Mediazona published a joint report on March 8 that at least 46,678 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, including at least 1,555 confirmed killed in the past two weeks.
  • Unspecified actors, likely Ukrainian partisans, assassinated a Russian occupation official in occupied Berdyansk, Kherson Oblast on March 6.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2024

Friday, March 8, 2024

MILPER 23-069 Implementation of Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB) Pay by Modality Table and Requirements for New FLPB Written Agreement.

A. REFERENCE:  Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1340.27 (Military Foreign Language Skill Proficiency Bonuses), 17 Aug 22

1.  This message will expire upon the release of the updated AR 11-6 or NLT 2 Mar 25.
   
2.  The Army DCS G-2 is implementing the new Pay by Modality table authorized by reference effective 1 March 2023.  The new FLPB rates are not retroactive.

3.  The maximum monthly FLPB rate will not exceed $1000 for single or multiple languages regardless of proficiency levels achieved. The new FLPB Pay by Modality table follows: 

Table 6-1.  FLPB Monthly Payments by Modality.
ILR Skill–Level Proficiency Listening (L)
$/month
Reading (R)
$/month
Speaking (S)
$/month
            1+ ** 75 75 75
            2 100 100 100
            2+  200 200 200
            3 300 300 300
            3+ 350 350 350
4 or higher 400 400 400

** Eligibility to draw FLPB at the 1+ rate is limited to ARSOF (AOCs and CMFs 18, 37, 38 and 180A Warrant Officers), USACAPOC (AOC and CMF 37 and 38) and Soldiers assigned to a SFAB.

4.  Soldiers who have a current FLPB Written Agreement affected by the new rates need to enter into a new Written Agreement .  The effective date on the new written agreement will be 01 March 2023.  There is no requirement to recertify a valid DLPT or OPI to enter into a new written agreement. The termination date of the new written agreement will remain the same as the previous written agreement. Example: A Soldier scored a 3 listening/3 reading on a DLPT taken on 1 October 2022 and has a current FLPB Written Agreement effective 1 October 2022 with a through date of 31 October 2024 authorizing FLPB in the amount of $400.  This Soldier will enter into a new FLPB Written Agreement effective 1 March 2023 through 31 October 2024 in the amount of $600 ($300 for 3 listening score/$300 for 3 reading score).


5.  Soldiers with a current FLPB written agreement based on DLPT/OPI scores of 1+/1+; 2/2; or 2/2/1+ are not required to enter into a new FLPB written agreement as the new Pay by Modality rates do not change their current FLPB rate.  Additionally, Soldiers currently receiving the maximum monthly authorized rate of $1000 for multiple languages are not required to enter into a new FLPB written agreement. The maximum monthly rate remains capped at $1000 per reference.

6.  All other Soldiers will prepare a new FLPB written agreement as found on MilSuite at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/flpb-test-group and process it in accordance with DA Pam 11-8, paragraph 6-7 for Regular Army, paragraph 6-8 for ARNG, and paragraph 6-9 for USAR.

7.  Soldiers will compute the amount of FLPB they are eligible to receive using the Pay by Modality Table 6-1 in paragraph 3 and the following policy:

a.  Officers, Warrant Officers, and Soldiers who serve in a language-dependent / language-capable MOS (other than MOS 35M, ARSOF (CMFs and AOCs 18, 37, 38), USACAPOC (CMFs 37 and 38), and Soldiers assigned to an SFAB); occupy a language coded billet; or qualify for FLPB based on their proficiency in a language on the Army Strategic Language List (ASLL) must first score a minimum of 2 in the Listening and Reading modalities (L2/R2) on the Lower Range Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) to qualify for FLPB.  In order to receive FLPB for all three modalities, these Officers, Warrant Officers, and Soldiers must first score L3/R3 or higher on the Lower Range DLPT to be eligible to take the Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI).  They must score at least S2 on their OPI to qualify for additional FLPB.

 b.  MOS 35M Soldiers.  Language qualified MOS 35M Soldiers who score L2/R2/S2 or higher on their Lower Range DLPT and OPI are eligible to draw FLPB for all three modalities.  For example, if a 35M Soldier takes their Lower Range DLPT and OPI and scores L2/R2/S2, they are eligible to draw FLPB for all three modalities ($300 per month).  35M Soldiers must take all three modalities within 60 days. The effective date for FLPB is based on the date the Soldier achieved a passing score on all three modalities.

c.  ARSOF, USACAPOC, and SFAB Soldiers: ARSOF (AOCs and CMFs 18, 37, 38 and 180A Warrant Officers), USACAPOC (AOCs and CMFs 37 and 38), and SFAB Officers, Warrant Officers, and Soldiers must obtain a minimum score of 1+/1+ to qualify for FLPB. In order to receive FLPB for all three modalities, ARSOF or SFAB Soldiers must score L2/R2 or higher on the Lower Range DLPT to become eligible to take an OPI and then must score at least an S2 on their OPI to qualify for additional FLPB (L2/R2/S2 or higher). For example, an ARSOF Soldier scores L2/R2 on their Lower Range DLPT. This Soldier is eligible to draw FLPB at level 2 for Listening and level 2 for Reading ($200 per month). They are also eligible to test for speaking because they scored L2/R2 on their DLPT. If they score a S2 on the OPI, then they would be eligible for a total FLPB payment of $300 per month.

d.  Two Score Oral Proficiency Interview (TSOPI).  Only ARSOF personnel are authorized to take a TSOPI to qualify for FLPB.  ARSOF Soldiers taking a TSOPI will draw FLPB for proficiency in the Listening and Speaking modalities only. They are not eligible to receive FLPB for all three modalities unless they take both the Listening and Reading Lower Range DLPT (in addition to the OPI) and achieve a minimum of L2/R2/S2.  

Dialects: Soldiers testing in additional languages/dialects where a common Reading DLPT is required (for example, Arabic-Modern Standard (AD) Reading and Levantine Listening; Chinese-Mandarin (CM) Reading and Chinese-Cantonese (CC) Listening) are only authorized FLPB for the common Reading modality one time.  For example, a 35P Soldier with AD as their CLANG tests on the AD Lower Range DLPT and achieves scores of L3/R3.  This same 35P Soldier tests on both the Yemeni and Levantine Listening DLPTs and achieves scores of L2 (Yemeni) and L2+ (Levantine).  This 35P Soldier is authorized FLPB at the following rates: AD $600 ($300 for each 3 achieved (L3/R3)), Yemeni $100 (L2), and Levantine $200 (L2+).  This 35P Soldier will receive FLPB in the amount of $900 monthly.

8.  Soldiers required to recertify on 1 March 2023 or later should refer to paragraph 3 and 7 above to calculate their FLPB rate.

Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB) pay

References:

You may visit the Army Electronic Publication System (APD) site at http://www.apd.army.mil/ to download Army Regulations.

Who is Eligible?:

 AR 11-6 applies to Active Army (AA), United States Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) - See paragraph 4-2.a for basic AA eligibility and paragraph 4-2.b for basic USAR and ARNG eligibility.

  • Soldiers with a language dependent capable MOS/Branch listed in AR 11-6, paragraph 4-6 are authorized FLPB for their Control Language (CLANG) and may qualify for additional languages designated as critical on the current ASLL provided they remain qualified in their CLANG.
  • Soldiers serving in a position with a Language Identification Code (LIC) on the unit's MTOE/TDA, attending or instructing in a Professional Military Education course taught in a foreign language or participating in the Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP) - AR 11-6, paragraph 4-7.
  • Soldiers with proficiency in a language designated as Immediate Investment or Emerging on the current ASLL regardless of MOS or duty position.  Languages designated as Enduring are restricted to Soldier with an MOS/Branch listed in AR 11-6, paragraph 4-6.

Additional Information:

Pay by Modality Implementation effective 1 March 2023 - MILPER 23-069

DA Form 4187 Written Agreement is the only authorized document to request FLPB payments.  Additional details and copies of the written agreements can be found on MilSuite at Group: The Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (... |milBook Home (milsuite.mil)

 SIGNIFICANT CHANGES to the General Purpose Forces Army Strategic Language (SLL) List effective 21 February 2023:

  • REMOVES all languages designated as Immediate Investment or Emerging.  Soldiers currently receiving FLPB for languages removed from the previous Army SLL will continue to receive FLPB through the end of their current agreement in accordance with paragraph 14.
  • ENDURING LANGUAGES ARE STILL RESTRICTED TO LANGUAGE DEPENDENT/CAPABLE PERSONNEL IDENTIFIED IN AR 11-6, PARAGRAPH 4-6.
  • Languages added to the Enduring list:  Arabic-Modern Standard (AD), Chinese-Amoy (YD/CD), Chinese-Cantonese (CC), Persian-Iranian (Farsi)(PF) and Ukrainian (UK).
  • CMF 37 and CMF 38 not assigned to an ARSOF unit will use the GPF Army SLL to determine eligibility to receive FLPB for languages in addition to their CLANG.

New Defense Language Proficiency Test - Computer Adaptive (DLPT-CA) - The Defense Language Institute (DLI) - Monterey has released the new DLPT-CA for Chinese-Mandarin as of 3 June 2021.  This is a new testing style and all service members taking the DLPT-CA for the first time are authorized a one time substitution of previous year's scores in accordance with AR 11-6, paragraph 4-6g and Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-2 memorandum dated 14 June 2018.  Currently, the DLPT-CA is offered for Spanish (QB) and Chinese-Mandarin (CM).

IT IS THE SOLDIER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO RETEST ANNUALLY. SOLDIERS CAN BEGIN TESTING THREE (3) MONTHS PRIOR TO THEIR TEST EXPIRATION DATE.

  • Local unit process routine written agreements and designated local educational test centers administer the testing (most testing is web based, some are orally conducted).
  • Language testing can be conducted at ANY "military service testing facility" worldwide.
  • The monthly FLPB rate is based on proficiency and the language payment list (Army Soldiers can receive from $150 and up to $1000 maximum for one language depending on which language and score).
  • For those who qualify for FLPB in multiple languages, the total monthly FLPB amount for multiple languages CANNOT exceed $1000.
  • If a Soldier is due an annual recertification, and at the time of the test expiration the Soldier is assigned OCONUS or deployed at a location where no testing facilities are available to include "other Services testing facilities", the recertification must be documented on a DA Form 4187 and certified by their Commander. When the Soldier returns to CONUS, a 180 day allowance is then given for the soldier to retest. The Soldier must be recertified within those 180 days by taking the DLPT.

For more information about the Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus, please send an email to: usarmy.knox.hrc.mbx.tagd-flpb@army.mil.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 7, 2024

Key Takeaways

  • Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) claimed that three Chinese Coast Guard ships entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone off the east coast of the main island on February 27.
  • The Kuomintang (KMT) initiated a legislative inquiry into the Kinmen capsizing incident to determine the liability of Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration. This supports the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to vilify and undermine domestic Taiwanese support for the Democratic Progressive Party.
  • PRC Premier Li Qiang’s work report to the National People’s Congress continued a trend of CCP officials using more belligerent language about “reunification” with Taiwan but did not signal a major policy change.
  • Recent PRC diplomatic outreach in Europe may aim to advance the PRC’s September 2023 Proposal on the Reform and Development of Global Governance, which faults the West for the war in Ukraine.
  • Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships fired water cannons and collided with Philippine ships while attempting to block a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-7-2024

Iran Update, March 7, 2024

Key Takeaways:

  • Gaza Strip: Western media reported that the United States will establish a temporary port in the Gaza Strip to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid.
  • Iran: Iranian military and security leaders are increasingly discussing the need to expand the Iranian military presence around the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq appears to have refocused its attacks to target primarily Israel rather than US forces for the moment.
  • West Bank: Unidentified Palestinian fighters detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeting Israeli forces around Tubas.
  • Iraq: Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki said that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias must refrain attacking US forces so that Baghdad can negotiate a timeline for the US withdrawal.
  • Yemen: Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting Hudaydah.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-7-2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 7, 2024

Key Takeaways:

  • Lithuanian intelligence assessed that Russia has the capability to continue sustaining the current tempo of its war in Ukraine and will likely have the capability to gradually expand its military capabilities in the near term.
  • Lithuanian intelligence also assessed that Russia is unlikely to abandon its long-term objectives of subjugating Ukraine even if Russian fails to achieve these objectives through military means.
  • Lithuanian intelligence assessed that Russia is preparing for confrontation with NATO in the long term while also waging its war in Ukraine.
  • Sweden formally joined NATO on March 7, becoming the 32nd member of the alliance.
  • The governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, met with Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko in Russia on March 7 as Moldovan authorities announced that a criminal case against Gutsul will soon go to court.
  • Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated Chinese calls for peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on March 7; Russia will likely continue to use such calls to promote long-standing information operations aimed at prompting Western concessions.
  • The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced on March 7 that it neutralized an Islamic State (IS) terrorist cell that had been preparing an attack on synagogues in Moscow.
  • Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kupyansk and Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on March 7.
  • Russian intelligence services likely continue to source and operate sanctioned precision machine tools and dual-use components to produce Russian military equipment.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2024

Thursday, March 7, 2024

Africa File, March 7, 2024: JNIM Strengthening Near Bamako; Kremlin and Nigeria Discuss Partnership

Key Takeaways:

  • Mali. Al Qaeda–affiliated militants recently conducted the first suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack in southern Mali since 2022, likely to support the group’s efforts to isolate a district capital nearly 175 miles north of the Malian capital. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate has rapidly strengthened in the region surrounding Bamako since the beginning of 2022 and will likely increase the rate and sophistication of its attacks farther south and amplify pressure around the Malian capital in the coming years.
  • Nigeria. The Nigerian and Russian foreign ministers met in Moscow on February 6 and outlined areas for increased bilateral cooperation and their states’ shared interests on issues such as the Israel-Hamas war. Nigeria likely will seek to expand its arms purchases from Russia during the coming years, strengthening this key area of preexisting cooperation. Nigeria’s recent criticism of Western military aid is similar to the grievances of their Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien neighbors, who have downgraded ties with the West in favor of Russia since 2021.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-march-7-2024-jnim-strengthening-near-bamako-kremlin-and-nigeria-discuss

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 6, 2024

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated on March 6 that Ukraine will try to seize the initiative and conduct unspecified counteroffensive actions in 2024.
  • Russian forces conducted a relatively larger series of drone and missile strikes targeting Ukraine on the night of March 5 to 6 and on March 6, including strikes on Odesa City during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis.
  • Kremlin officials continue to invoke nuclear threats as part of ongoing Russian information operations aimed at weakening Western support for Ukraine and deterring Western aid to Ukraine.
  • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the security of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and nuclear non-proliferation issues on March 6 in Sochi, Russia.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the governor of pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, on March 6 and emphasized Russia’s support for Gagauzia.
  • Moldova suspended the Cold War-era Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty on March 6.
  • The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a drone strike on a mining and processing plant in Kursk Oblast on March 6.
  • Armenia appears to be taking limited measures to reduce its bilateral security cooperation with Russia outside of its reduced participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
  • Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kupyansk and Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • The Russian legal system continues efforts to use the Russian criminal justice system to augment Russia’s recruitment base.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2024