USAREUR-AF RWOW TROIKA Observations as of 12:00 CET, 24 January 2024

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

USAREUR-AF RWOW TROIKA Observations as of 12:00 CET, 24 January 2024 / 06:00

EST, Day #700



DISCLAIMER: The information provided in Troika Observations is for general informational purposes only and is gathered via Russian and Ukrainian open sources of information. The Troika Team makes no implied guarantee regarding the accuracy or reliability of the sources.



The Troika Observations are normally published on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. All operational directions below are usually discussed from north to south and east to west.



NOTE: There will be no Troika Observations on Friday 26 January as the Troika will be enroute to Garmisch, Germany for the 7th iteration of the Russian Way of War course for Eurasian FAOs and other select personnel. The Troika Observations will resume on Monday 29 January.



Troika Insights (1):



(1) Russian Adaptation in UAVs - experimentation from duct tape to supervised learning. The following is from a November 2023 Ukrainian Military EW analyst post on Telegram: Son -"Dad, do you honestly make airplanes?" Dad- "Yes son, and today I'll take you to work, we'll glue on grandma's phone and mom's power bank with duct tape, and we'll watch where the airplane flies." Although meant to be humorous and sarcastic, this post was referring to several Shahed 136 (Geran-2) UAVs which were downed by the UAF in November 2023. The UAVs had a 4G Kyivstar SIM Card, a LTE modem, and two flexible antennas secured to the UAV with black duct tape. While the quality of the rigging of these UAVs appeared to resemble a child's grade school science project, these UAVs reportedly maintained strong signal control while flying through several UAF air defense observation posts. In a larger sense, however, the post also encapsulated ongoing Russian efforts to adapt and test new ideas in UAV use in the Special Military Operation (SMO) while attempting to transcend the UAV technological parity between the two sides and find more effective and lethal UAV uses that can be implemented at scale.



            "Judgment Night" - FPV UAVs for night attacks. In late November
2023, videos began to appear on the "Sudoplatov" Telegram channel showing RF

AF night attacks against unsuspecting UAF forces using FPV UAVs. The RF AF
reportedly purchased "budget" light-sensitive cameras "capable of seeing in
the dark with minimal lighting," attached them to their kamikaze FPV UAVs,
and experimented with conducting harassing strikes against static and moving
Ukrainian soldiers, equipment, and vehicles. Later more expensive and better

resolution thermal cameras were added, which increased the effectiveness of
the attacks. Although these types of night cameras are well behind
traditional UAV video cameras in resolution quality, the resolution seemed to be "good
enough" for experienced RF AF UAV operators to acquire and engage targets
and disrupt Ukrainian night operations. This presents a significant ongoing
challenge for the UAF because of its reliance upon the cover of night to
conduct the reorganization, relocation, rotation, and resupply of their
units, as well as infiltration operations away from the peering eyes of military
and commercial grade UAVs that saturate the battlespace in Ukraine by day.
Although these UAV night attacks have not succeeded at a large-scale, they
continue and the Troika expects to see more of these harassing types of
attacks this year as the Russians continue to experiment with improvements
to these UAVs, as well as how to deliver them in larger volumes.



            FPV UAVs that learn. A bigger concern for both sides is the development of FPV UAVs with machine vision and automatic target acquisition, an advancement that both Ukraine and Russia are reportedly working on in
earnest. FPV UAVs of this type have already been tested in small quantities
in the SMO and several Russian enterprises are reportedly working on the
development and large-scale implementation of this technology. In essence,
it combines a commercial type of "supervised machine learning" with an advanced

processor that teaches the UAV to "see" what it is doing and make quick
decisions based on what it sees. In this case, the UAV is not deciding which

target is to be engaged but making its own adjustments enroute to engage an
already selected target. This includes allowing the UAV to detect and avoid
obstacles or interference enroute to its target. The UAV operator would no
longer have to play a FPV UAV version of "Mario Cart" to chase down targets
over terrain and obstacles while being subjected to EW interference attempts

to sever the signal between the UAV and the operator. In this case, the UAV
operator simply must launch the UAV and fly it toward the desired target.
Once the target is selected and "locked," the UAV remembers it and continues the
flight on its own to engage the target. The advantages of such an innovation

in the current situation in Ukraine are numerous. EW domes and other trench
EW systems would be rendered mostly ineffective provided the UAV operator
selects the target and releases the UAV at a range beyond the effective range of
these EW systems. It also increases both the accuracy of hits on moving targets
and the flight range of the UAV, as the loss of communication with the operator
once the target is acquired would no longer be a concern. Finally, it would
eliminate the need for weeks and even months of FPV UAV operator training
required to successfully fly UAVs "manually" to the target. The training
time varies among the various types of commercial UAVs, with the more
sophisticated FPV UAV models requiring more extensive training to achieve operator
proficiency. The RF AF has made a significant investment over the past year
in recruiting and training UAV operators for its various military grade and
commercial UAVs. Based on recruitment ads that came out in late December
2023, those numbers will continue to grow in 2024. This new capability, whether on
a new UAV model or on one or more of the various Russian commercial UAV models

already being used (e.g., "VT-40," "Ghoul," or "Gadfly"), could create an additional dilemma for the UAF with minimal personnel recruiting or training investment on the Russian side.



            From "Beta" to Production at Scale. Ukraine and Russia have been

experimenting at length with UAV development and implementation. The
Ukrainians were well ahead of the Russians at the outset of the SMO in
commercial UAV use, however the Russians learned (copied from) from the
Ukrainians to narrow the gap over time. The key to incorporating these
experimental UAV ideas and technologies is to be able to develop and produce

them at scale. This is where the Russians have the edge. The Russians have
fully mobilized their defense industry and have 20+ years of experience
developing and producing military grade UAVs - UAVs that include samples of
the best of Israeli and Iranian UAV technologies. There are also
well-organized and well-coordinated networks across Russia that have been
particularly effective in obtaining, producing, and providing very large
quantities of various types of commercial UAVs and FPV UAVs to the RF AF
over
the past year, and that will continue in 2024. Finally, Russia plans to
"double-down" on UAV development and production in 2024 with the
commencement
of the "Unmanned Aircraft Systems" national project. The plan includes
allocating 64 billion rubles ( ~$715 million USD) to the project from 2024
to
2026, for a total of 900 billion rubles (~$9.9 billion USD) investment until

2030. That buys a lot of duct tape.

*       NOTE: After the 2008 Russia - Georgia war, Israeli UAV companies
partnered
with Russian companies and produced UAVs in Russia. By 2010, Israeli
Aerospace
Industries had a $400 million UAV investment transferring UAV technologies
to
Russia. The earlier Russian-produced Forpost UAV (a copy of the Israeli
Searcher II UAVs built on license) was a result of this bilateral
cooperation.
Israeli - Russian UAV collaboration slowly died after 2015 when
Israeli-designed, Russian-produced UAVs which had been transferred to the
Assad government in Syria were shot down by Israeli IDF air defenses on
Israel's
frontiers.



General Observations:



- Russian missile attacks on Ukraine. The RF Aerospace Forces (VKS)
conducted
another predawn missile attack on 23 January against several cities in
Ukraine, including Kyiv and Kharkiv. According to the UAF, a total of 41 x
missiles were launched in multiple directions. These included the following:
4
x S-300/S-400 missiles launched from the Belgorod region of Russia towards
the
Kharkiv region; 15 x Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh-55 cruise missiles launched from 6 x
TU-95M3 bombers near Engels, Russia; 8 x Kh-22 missiles launched from
TU-22M3
bombers operating in the Bryansk and Oryol regions in the direction of
Kharkiv
and Sumy regions; 12 x Iskander-M ballistic missiles launched from Belgorod
and Voronezh regions; and 2 x Kh-59 guided missiles launched from 2 x Su-34
aircraft operating out of the Belgorod region. UAF air defenses reportedly
successfully intercepted 21 of the 41 x missiles launched.



- The Commander of the RF VKS IL-22M aircraft damaged over the Sea of Azov
on
14 January reportedly KIA. Information about the death of MAJ Viktor Klimov
appeared on the Facebook page of Russian test pilot Alexander Garnaev, who
claimed to have studied with MAJ Klimov's father, Ivan Klimov (also a
pilot).
MAJ Klimov apparently died from shrapnel wounds suffered during the strike
against the aircraft. The co-pilot of the aircraft, also injured in the
strike
managed to crash land the plane in Anapa, Russia. There has been no official

confirmation of Klimov's death.



- RF AF continues to look for better anti-UAV protection solutions for
armored
equipment and other vehicles. The Troika has seen these vehicle protection
kits develop over time. These kits include range from basic screens, grills
and racks ("BBQ grills") on the top of the vehicle, to complete metal cages
over the top of the vehicle with metal screens on the sides. In some cases,
the metal cages on the top of RF AF tanks are installed with very little
space
between the cage and the top of the tank, making it not only extremely
difficult for the crew to get in and out of the vehicle through the hatches.

Additional explosive reactive armor (ERA) bricks are sometimes applied in
select locations. This technique is seen in a recent video where a RF AF
T-90M
tank not only had the top of the tank completely encased in a large metal
protective cage installed very close to the top of the tank (to include over

the two top hatches), but the surface of the cage was also completely
covered
in Kontakt-1 ERA bricks, with the exception of the cage part directly above
the two top hatches.



- New RF MoD two-year contract scheme for Russian prisoners "opting" to
serve
in the SMO. Copies of a two-year contract signed in December 2023 by a 27
year
old prisoner from Dagestan were posted recently on social media by the
Russian
Human Rights Organization "Gulag.net." The prisoner was arrested in 2020 for

distributing narcotics and sentenced in 2022 to a 14-years in a maximum
security penal colony. He was released from the penal colony in December
2023,
only after signing a multiple page contract with the RF MoD with an
extensive
list of obligations to fulfill and was immediately assigned to the RF GF
488th
MRR. According to relatives of the prisoner, he had previously resisted
serving in the SMO when recruited by PMC Wagner and later when the RF MoD
came
looking for personnel to fill Storm-Z units. Previously, contracts for
prisoners serving in PMC Wagner were 6 x months in length, which then
increased to one year for prisoners recruited by MoD to serve in Storm-Z
units.

*       NOTE: There has been various reporting in recent months of the
Federal
Penitentiary Service of Russia creating "conditions" in the penal colonies
to
incentivize prisoners into signing contracts with the RF MoD. Prison
officials
work closely with the FSB (which has overall authority of the process), the
MoD which coordinates recruitment, and the Ministry of Interior which fast
tracks required documentation. In the case of the prisoner from Dagestan,
his
new passport was issued on 15 December 2023, eight days before he signed his

two-year contract.



Operational Directions.



Sloviansk Operational Direction (Belgorod, Valyuki, Kupyansk, Svatove, Kreminna, Lysychansk, Bakhmut, Donbas North):



- RF GF 47th TD reinforced itself at Krokhmalne and 5.5 km to the northwest which 153rd TR / 47th TD captured last Saturday, 19 January. 47th TD cut the P-07 road east of Tabaivka, the main road between Kupyansk and Svatove, 25km southeast of Kupyansk, 20 km northwest of Svatove, and 5 km northwest of Novoselivske. This left isolated UAF units defending west of RF GF 1st GTA-controlled Novoselivske, 17 km northwest of Svatove.



- Back-and-forth fighting continued Monday, south of Bilohorivka, north-northeast of Bakhmut at Vesele, Spirne, and Rozdolivka between RF GF 2nd Guards Army Corps and UAF.



Donetsk Operational Direction (Donetsk, Vuhledar, Donbas South, Mariupol):



- On the RF GF 8th GCAA's northern axis to double envelop Avdiivka, 2nd GCAA attacks west toward Stepove have temporarily stopped. Based on recent videos, UAF has spent several days clearing RF GF 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade bunkers, abandoned WIAs, and abandoned stay-behinds.



- On Monday, 22 January, RF GF continued to attack south at Kamianka (3 km northeast of Avdiivka) as part of an apparent shallow envelopment of east Avdiivka.



- Friday through Sunday, 19 through 21 January, RF GF 87th Rifle Regiment attacked and advanced north in intense fighting to the "Hunter's Lodge," 500m south of Avdiivka's southernmost neighborhood (north of Spartak). UAF
controls the area to the northeast in "the Winery," between 87th Rifle Regiment and RF GF 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade ("the Sloviansk Brigade) /1st Army Corps in the industrial area ("the Promka") 1 km southeast of downtown Avdiivka. The fight at the Hunter's Lodge seems to have the UAF's complete attention.



- Southwest of Avdiivka, RG GF 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade / 1st Army Corps continued its attacks west towards downtown and northwest toward downtown from Pisky.



Zaporizhzhia Operational Direction (Zaporizhzhia, Melitopol, Berdyansk):



NSTR



South Kherson Operational Direction (Mykolaiv, Kherson, Nova Kakhovka):



NSTR



Supplemental Observations:



- RF VKS aircraft accidentally dropped a bomb in Belgorod Oblast: On 21 January, a RF VKS aircraft accidentally dropped a FAB-250 bomb on a dam near the village of Ionovka, Belgorod Oblast, Russia causing partial destruction
of the dam. No casualties were reported.

Read More

Russian Operations Assessment 23JAN2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Western states reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) at the 18th Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 23. 

• NATO concluded contracts on January 23 for the purchase over 200,000 artillery shells, likely either to allow NATO to send additional aid to Ukraine or to replenish NATO stockpiles. 

• Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are struggling to compensate for Ukrainian drone and rear-area strikes at the level necessary to break out of positional warfare. 

• Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 22-23 with a new strike package likely meant to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. 

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and Palestinian National Authority Foreign Minister Riyad al Maliki as part of efforts to deepen Russian relations with Middle Eastern actors. 

• The Kremlin’s domestic policy focus on the “Year of the Family” in 2024 is likely in part meant to address Russia’s ongoing demographic crisis. 

• The Russian Baltic Fleet is conducting a coastal missile exercise likely to posture against ongoing NATO Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises. 

• The Kremlin may intend to use the 2024 Russian presidential election as a referendum on Russia’s war in Ukraine. • The Russian legal system is expanding the prosecution of extortion cases to broadly suppress sources of dissent.

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on January 23. 

• Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) government chairperson Yevgeny Solntsev announced on January 23 that a branch of the Russian Nakhimov Naval School in occupied Mariupol will start instructing its first cadets on September 1, 2024. 

• Russian occupation authorities are likely deliberately misrepresenting population statistics in occupied areas to encourage people to relocated to occupied settlements.

Read More

Iran Update 23JAN2024

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias claimed attacks in areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. The claimed attacks are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas and other Palestinian militias are likely in the early stages of reconstituting their governance and military capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip.

• Central Gaza Strip: Hamas’ military wing conducted a complex attack that killed 21 Israeli soldiers in the deadliest single attack since Israeli ground operations began. The IDF Chief of Staff said that the fallen soldiers were conducting a defensive activity that will allow Israeli residents to return to their homes surrounding the Gaza Strip.

• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces located an underground weapons production facility that it the largest found to date. Palestinian militias are continuing to execute a deliberate defense against Israeli operations in western Khan Younis.

• Political Negotiations: Israel proposed a two-month pause in fighting in exchange for Hamas releasing over several phases the remaining hostages held in the Gaza Strip. An anonymous Egyptian official told the Associated Press that Hamas rejected the proposal.

• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters twice in the West Bank. The IDF detained eight wanted individuals and confiscated weapons.

• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah claimed three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. Israeli media reported that the IDF Air Force destroyed an unspecified military asset used by Hezbollah but operated by Iran.

•Iraq: The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Shia political factions—discussed Iranian-backed militia efforts to “provoke” US self-defense strikes in a meeting.

•Syria: Israel likely conducted two airstrikes targeting an IRGC weapons storage facility and an Iranian-backed militia truck transporting weapons around Albu Kamal, Syria.

•Yemen: US and UK forces conducted combined strikes on eight Houthi military targets in Yemen. The Houthis are harassing UN operations and personnel in Yemen.

•Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei criticized Islamic countries for not demanding a ceasefire for the Israel-Hamas war during a meeting with the Tehran branch of the Martyrs’ Commemoration National Congress.

Read More

Iran Update 22JAN2024

Key Takeaways: 

• The Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces “expanded” ground operations in Khan Younis to “dismantle” Hamas’ military forces in Khan Younis. 

• The Northern Gaza Strip: Hamas and other Palestinian fighters are likely in the early stages of the reconstitution of their military and governance capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip. 

• The West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters seven times across the West Bank on January 22. 

• Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 22. 

• Iraq: The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned Iraqi airline Fly Baghdad for aiding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force and its militias in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three attacks targeting US positions in Syria and Iraq on January 22. 

• Yemen: The Houthis claimed that they conducted a missile attack targeting an American military cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden on January 22. 

• Iran: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) held a funeral ceremony in Tehran on January 22 for three IRGC Quds Force officers that Israel killed in Syria. Israel’s strike on January 20 was a response to Iran’s efforts to accelerate its supply of military equipment to Hezbollah, which is using the equipment to support attacks into northern Israel.

Read More

Russian Operations Assessment 22JAN2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Russia continues to weaponize its position on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to propagate several long-standing Russian information operations. 

• Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited Kyiv on January 22 and announced a new Polish defense package for Ukraine. 

• Footage purportedly showing an altercation between a Russian soldier and Chechen “Akhmat-Vostok” forces in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, reignited criticism of Chechen forces for their lack of contributions to Russian military operations in Ukraine. 

• An investigation by a Russian opposition outlet suggests that Russian elites may have accepted and internalized the domestic consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine. 

• Russian officials and information space actors are attempting to further rhetorically justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by misrepresenting a decree that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed on January 22 concerning discrimination against ethnic Ukrainians in Russia. Zelensky’s decree does not establish any territorial demands upon Russia, as select Russian ultranationalists falsely claimed. 

• Russian forces made confirmed advances south of Avdiivka and west of Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.

• Kyrgyzstan issued a statement against Russia’s continued practice of targeting naturalized migrants as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts. 

• Russian federal subjects continue to establish ties with areas of occupied Ukraine.

Read More

PPM CIO-012 ENHANCED MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_c/ARN43980-PPM_CIO-012-000-WEB-1.pdf

Read More

Iran Update 18JAN2024

Key Takeaways:

• The Pakistani armed forces conducted cross-border attacks targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran. Iranian officials and state media attempted to deescalate after the Pakistani airstrikes.

• The Houthi supreme leader, Abdulmalik al Houthi, stated that US and UK vessels have become legitimate targets for Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi said that the group would interpret an attack on the Houthis as an attack on KH in a letter to the Houthi supreme leader.

• Palestinian fighters are attacking Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. This activity is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas is likely reinfiltrating some of these areas.

• Israeli forces destroyed Hamas’ main weapons manufacturing facility in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip. Israeli clearing operations are likely one of the factors constraining Palestinian militia's ability to conduct indirect fire attacks into Israel.

• The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) raided an outpost of Hamas’ Southern Khan Younis Battalion in southern Khan Younis City. Palestinian fighters launched multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around Khan Younis City.

• Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters six times across the West Bank. Israeli forces continued raids targeting Palestinian fighters in the Tulkarm refugee camp.

• Lebanese Hezbollah claimed five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. Unspecified fighters launched three rockets into the Golan Heights from Syria as well. 

• Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri, and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki discussed efforts to “strengthen national sovereignty” in a meeting. 

• Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reiterated that he seeks to restructure the presence of US-led coalition forces in Iraq during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. 

• Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian discussed the January 15 IRGC drone and missile strikes in Erbil, Iraq, with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in a phone call. 

• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting US forces in Himu, northeastern Syria. 

• The Jordanian Royal Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-linked drug smuggling operations in southern Syria.

Read More

Russian Operations Assessment 18JAN2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia is not interested in negotiations with Ukraine or the West. 

• The battlespace in Ukraine continues to be the center of the technological offensedefense race between Russian and Ukrainian forces. 

• Recent widespread GPS disruptions across Poland and the Baltic region are prompting speculation about the potential operation of Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems in the region. 

• The French Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 18 that it launched an “artillery coalition” to strengthen support for Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian statements that Russian forces in Ukraine have superior artillery capabilities. 

• Ukrainian partisans and satellite imagery confirmed that Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea in late December 2023 sank a Russian Tarantul-class corvette near Sevastopol. 

• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a successful drone strike on Russian military facilities in Leningrad Oblast on January 18. 

• The European Union (EU) Parliament voted to endorse another step in a rule of law procedure that could eventually suspend Hungary’s voting rights after Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban vetoed an EU vote for further military assistance to Ukraine. 

• Russia and the Central African Republic (CAR) are in negotiations regarding Russian military basing in CAR. 

• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional engagements along the front. 

• Russian officials continue to target naturalized migrants as part of ongoing cryptomobilization efforts. 

• Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to restore logistics infrastructure in occupied Ukraine.

Read More

Russian Operations Assessment 17JAN2024

Key Takeaways: 

• A Ukrainian intelligence official reported that Russian forces lack the necessary operational reserves to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts in more than one direction in Ukraine. 

• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated on January 17 that the elimination of Ukrainian statehood and independence remains one of Russia’s core war aims. 

• Ukraine successfully employed a Ukrainian-refurbished hybrid air defense system (FrankenSAM) for the first time.

• Germany and France announced additional military assistance to Ukraine on January 16. 

• The Russian ultranationalist community will likely concretize xenophobia and insecurities about Russia’s ethnic composition as key shared principles within the community in 2024, as Russian ultranationalists continue to seize on incidents involving migrants and non-ethnic Russian groups to call for anti-migrant policies and express growing hostility towards nonethnic Russians in Russia. 

• The Kremlin’s ongoing attempt to court the Russian ultranationalist community will likely generate increasing friction between the Kremlin’s desired rhetoric and policies concerning migration and interethnic relations and those of Russian ultranationalists. 

• Significant protests erupted in Baymak, Bashkortostan Republic, following a Russian court’s guilty verdict for a prominent Bashkort activist, prompting a swift Russian government response as well as backlash from the Russian ultranationalist community. 

• Widespread Russian milblogger complaints about an Uzbek community leader in Russia prompted the Russian Investigative Committee to open a criminal investigation, suggesting that the Russian government may feel increasing pressure to respond to milblogger demands as the ultranationalist information space coalesces around xenophobic and anti-migrant ideals. 

• The Russian military command continues to convict Russian officers in cases associated with Ukrainian strikes as part of a likely effort to improve discipline across the Russian military. 

• The Kremlin continues efforts to expand Russia’s influence in Africa through the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoD-controlled Africa Corps. 

• The threat of US secondary sanctions is reportedly having a large-scale effect on TurkishRussian financial ties. 

• Positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact on January 17. 

• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov confirmed that Russian authorities are increasing the size of the Rosgvardia contingent in occupied Ukraine to strengthen occupational control.

Read More

Iran Update 17JAN2024

Key Takeaways: 

• Palestinian fighters are attacking Israeli forces in areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces conducted clearing operations previously. 
• The Gaza Strip is experiencing the longest, largest-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began. 
   Israel and Hamas began implementing a deal on January 17 that aims to supply medicine for Israeli hostages in exchange for additional humanitarian flow into the Gaza Strip. 
• IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said that the likelihood of war in northern Israel is “higher than before” on January 17 while attending IDF drills simulating an offensive in Lebanon. 
• Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani is attempting to retain some US presence in Iraq by restructuring Iraq’s security agreement, despite pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to expel US forces entirely. This policy is at odds with Iranian-backed Iraqi actors’ maximalist demands to immediately remove all US forces from Iraq. 
• The US State Department redesignated the Houthis as specially designated global terrorists on January 17. 
• The Pakistani government has strongly condemned and warned of possible retaliation for the IRGC strikes.

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